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This paper aims to analyze the dynamic relationship between foreign direct investment 
FDI and different kinds of risks in the MENA countries. Using the vector autoregressive 
technique on the country level for eleven MENA countries during the period of 1980-
2003, the findings indicate that despite the fact that, the macroeconomic performance 
and the political (in) stability are important issues in affecting the decision of FDI and 
determining its location; however, the cultural environment, particularly corruption 
level, is also having its special effects on this theme in the MENA countries.  
These results should attract the attention of policymakers; since they reveal that: it is 
neither the economical risk nor the political risks that mostly perform threats and shy 
away FDI from the MENA countries (as usually point to), but it is a contagion “disease” 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Sudden and sharp capital inflow reversals have been a key feature of recent 
emerging market crises. While short-term flows have been mostly volatile and unwanted, 
long-term capital flows such as foreign direct investment (FDI), which tend to be more 
stable, are increasingly desirable (Lipsey 2001). In addition to the volatility factor, there 
are many other essential motivations as to why developing economies are interested in 
attracting FDI; like  beside being an additional financial resource, the transfer of 
intangible assets such as technology, know-how and technical skills, is widely accepted 
as being the most important motivations. 
Given this importance, FDI as a source of capital in the developing world has 
increased considerably over the past two decades -see Figure 1-  as a reflection of the 
improvements in the local investment perceived by investor, on account of the adoption 
by many countries of sound macroeconomic and structural reform measures (Chan and 
Gemayel, 2004).  
 
  Figure 1 
  Net Foreign Direct Investment to the Developing Countries, 1985-2003 (billion of US$) 
 
  
  Source: World Bank (2003). 
 
Mainly, this tremendous increase in FDI is undoubtedly related to the 
globalization of the world economy and the integration of the financial markets, however, 




Net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP to Developing countries, 1980-2005
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
East Asia and Pacific 0.41 0.57 1.58 3.90 2.65 3.22
Europ and Central Asia 0.02 0.08 .. 1.67 3.16 3.55
European Monetary Union 0.38 0.44 1.08 1.08 10.25 3.16
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.88 0.86 0.75 1.82 4.07 2.87
MENA 0.70 0.47 0.25 0.33 1.26 2.42
South Asia 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.63 0.72 0.98
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.06 0.44 0.41 1.44 2.02 2.70
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance: Country Tables.   
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In many instances a rational explanation can be found, as in countries facing 
conflicts. However, in many other cases such an observation is confusing, as one would 
expect multinational companies to take advantage of the low production costs in the 
MENA region. Many observers such as Eid and Paua (2002) and Onyeiwu (2003) among 
others have argued that the capacity of many MENA countries to attract FDI has so far 
been principally determined by the existence of natural resources, as in the case of 
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The paper is motivated by the fact that despite large 
increases in FDI in emerging markets since the 1980s, the MENA region share was 
dismal. While net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP have grown by an average of six 
fold between 1985 and 2004 in most of the other regions, whilst of MENA has stagnated 
during that period (see Table 1). 
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: section two briefly presents a 
literature review on the relationship between foreign direct investment and different kinds 
of risks in the MENA counties; section three elucidates the methodology and describes 
the variables and their sources. Whereas section four illustrates the empirical results, and 
finally section five is a discussion of the results and conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Historically, countries in the MENA region have a higher level of instability 
associated with investment risk relative to DCs. In some cases a rational explanation can 
be found as, for example, for countries experiencing conflict like Algeria and Sudan; 
which their very difficult internal conflict is a major impediment to any investment 
(Garibaldi, et al., 2002). This fact is supported by Lucas (1990), when he argues that the 
reason why multinational companies continue to produce in high-cost developed 
countries is because among other factors, these countries are considered to be politically 
stable, whereas, investments in many “low-cost” countries, by contrast, are exposed to 
political risk.  
Many empirical studies such as Hawkins and Lockwood (2001), and Janeba 
(2002) among others have concluded that political (in) stability was found to have an 
impact on the inflow of FDI. Same result can be said regarding the other MENA 
countries (Alessandrini, 2000; Sadik and Bolbol, 2003; Onyeiwu, 2003; Mellahi, et al., 
2003). 
However, in many other cases such an observation is confusing, especially in 
countries whose their political situation is stable, and yet they suffer from a low level of 
FDI. In other words, while a stable political environment is desirable, it is not a sufficient 
condition for attracting FDI; as one would expect multinational companies to take 
advantage of the low production costs in the MENA region, other would expect the 
capacity for the MENA countries to attract FDI has so far been principally determined by 
the existence of natural resources (Chan Gemayel, 2003), but despite these expectations 
the results are still below the par.  
According to UNCTAD (2002), FDI to the MENA countries recorded a longer 
decline of 33% dropping in 2002, from $6.7 billion in 2001 to $4.5 billion in 2002, which 
accounted for almost 2.8% of total FDI inflow in the DCs. First reason for that is the 
serious internal/ regional political instability facing major MENA countries (Algeria, 
Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Palestine, Iraq and Sudan) manage to affect their international 
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relations (Eid and Paua, 2003). Second reason is that the MENA countries are 
characterized of institutional instability and predictability (Ngowi, 2001), which cause a 
reduction in the investor’s confidence, pose obstacles to sustained FDI flows, and 
complicate the economic development of these countries. That even hosts countries that 
suffer from such problems and at the same time possess abundant natural resources, how 
further incentives they may provide, they are still considered to be political unstable 
countries (Ana, 1997). Third reason is the fact that the macroeconomic environment in 
several MENA countries is still characterized by constraints such -see Table 2-, in a way 
that makes maintaining macroeconomic stability is a big challenge for many MENA 
countries (Iqbal, 2001). 
One could believe that such weaknesses do explain why politically stable 
countries in the MENA region suffer from a high level of uncertainly that make them 
receive a tiny share of FDI in compare with other politically unstable countries. The 
fourth reason has been given by Allessandrini (2000) in his analysis of the FDI in the 
Mediterranean Region, he argues that the authorization regimes, with the exception of 
Israel and Lebanon, still lack automatism and transport procedures which is something 
not preferable for the foreign investors (although some improvements have been 
undertaken in Algeria, Jordan, Palestine and Morocco). 
 
1 Fragile political systems and structure.
2 Vulnerability to violent civil or cross border conflicts.
3 Weak governance and poor administration.
4 Weak institutional capabilities with legal systems that don’t protect property rights
or offer redress in real time. 5 Undeveloped financial and business systems.
6 Weak regulatory regimes for enforcing fear competition.
7 Inadequate physical infrastructure and poor infrastructure services.
8 Relatively undeveloped markets.
9 Low level of human and social capital.
10 Exchange controls and weak currencies subject to large frequent devaluations.
 
Table 2
Economic environment constraints in DCs as well as in the MENA countries
(Development financing, 2000).  
 
Certainly, the environment climate, macroeconomic performance and the political 
(in) stability are important issues in determining the location of FDI. However, the 
cultural environment (communications, religions, values and ideologies, and social 
structure) has also special importance in multinational business. The importance of 
understanding the cultures of countries in which a multinational company operates – as 
well as similarities and differences among those cultures – becomes clear when we look 
at the multitude of modern manager’s blunders in multinational business (Miroshnik, 
2002). 
  Management practices that are suited for their own culture environment may 
bring about undesirable, perhaps terrible, consequences in another culture. For example, 
problems result when managers’ export marketing campaigns developed in one country 
without adapting them to another country. For instance; Muslim people will never eat any 
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food if it is packed in a box with a picture of any naked human. In addition, cultural 
diversity causes problems when the organization must reach a single agreement. For 
instance; negotiations between Japanese and Arabic people are very difficult, because of 
the big differences in the decision-making and the legal system. Japanese never say “no”, 
it is very impolite in their opinion, but it does not mean that they agree, so they will say, 
“yes, we are absolutely disagreeing”. However, for the Arabs, if the partner says “yes”, it 
is the time to celebrate the success.  
To avoid such problems: either the multinationals choose a location where the 
physical distance is shorter and cultural barriers are easily overcome (Galan and Benito, 
2001), for example, the gravity model used by Gao (2005) shows that the huge amount of 
FDI inflow from Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong to China is mainly due to the 
cultural ties and geography closeness between them. Or it can allocate in a far distance 
place; where the foreign investor choose to have a partnership from appropriate local 
business to help him deal with the national culture difference (Pan and Chi, 1999). 
Otherwise, to work alone; where in this case the modern managers must understand the 
core concept of the culture. To ignore cultural differences is unproductive, however; 
judging cultural differences as good or bad can lead to inappropriate, racist, sexist, and 
ethnocentric behaviors (Hanson, 1999), while, recognizing cultural differences does not 
(Adler, 1983a; 1983b).  
This paper extends the limited empirical literature on the risks that affects FDI 
inflows to the MENA countries, by answering the following question on the country 
level, which is the main dominant risk (economical, political, and cultural risk) that 
affects FDI inflows? And what is the dynamic relationship between FDI inflows and 
these risks?  
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
The use of vector autoregressive VAR model is to investigate the simultaneous 
interactions of dominant risks and FDI flows. The VAR technique as applied to a 
simultaneous equation system, estimates unrestricted reduced form equations with 
uniform sets of the lagged dependent variables of each equation as regressors. Because 
this approach sets no restrictions on the structural relationships of the economic variables, 
it avoids mis- specification problems. The VAR methodology is suitable when variables 
within the model are highly autocorrelated. Furthermore, the VAR approach enables us to 
analyze the speed of information transmission among variables in the system, which 
would provide insight into the dynamic nature of the interactions between FDI flows and 
three kinds of risks for each country. 
The VAR model can be expressed in its standard form as: 







                                                       (1) 
Where FDI(t) is a 4x1 column vector of FDI flows and three kinds of risks (inflation rate, 
logarithm political risk index and logarithm corruption index) in time t. C is a 4x1 
column vector of constant terms, A(k) is a 4x4 matrix of Coefficients such that the (i, j)th 
component of A(k) measures the direct effect that a change in the ith variable has upon 
the jth variable after k periods. 
In particular, the ith component of e(t) is the innovation of the ith variable that 
cannot be predicted from the past values of other values in the system. e(t) is a 4x1 
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column vector of innovations such that ( ) 0=iteE , ( ) 22 iiteE s= , ( ) ijjtit eeE s=,  and 
( ) 0, =-kjtit eeE  
Thus, the innovations, e(t), are serially uncorrelated but can be contemporaneously 
correlated. To analyze the dynamics of the system, I trace out the system’s moving 
average representation which may provide additional insight into the dynamic 
interactions among the variables in the VAR model (Sims 1980). Thus, the VAR model 
of equation (1) is typically transformed into its moving average representation expressed 
as: 





                                                                             (2) 
Equation (2) indicates that FDI(t) is a linear combination of current and past one-step-
ahead forecast errors (i.e. e(t)). The (i, j)th component of B(k) reveals the response of the 
ith variable to a unit random shock in the jth variable after k periods. The moving average 
model of equation (2) enables us to compute the m-step-ahead forecast error of FDI(t) at 
time t-m+1 which can be expressed as  ( ) ( )ktekB -å   for K=0 to m-1. In addition, the 
variance decomposition of the forecast error gives us the percentage of unexpected 
variation in each variable that is produced by shocks from other variables in the system. 
As stated earlier, the innovations, e(t) in equation (1) may be contemporaneously 
correlated, for example, the covariance matrix of innovations is not diagonal. When 
innovations in variables are contemporaneously correlated, a shock in one variable may 
work through the contemporaneous correlations with innovations in other variables. It is 
customary to transform these correlations by orthogonalizing the innovations in the VAR 
system according to a pre-specified causal ordering. After the transformation, the above 
equation can be expressed as, 





                                                                          (3) 
Where the transformed innovations u(t), are now uncorrelated with each other at all lags 
as well as contemporaneously. The moving-average representation of the VAR model 
provides a convenient framework for tracing the dynamics to shocks in the system. The 
(i, j)th component of C(k) in equation (3) represents the impulse response of the ith 
variable in k periods after a shock of one standard error in the jth variable. That is, if there 
is a unit shock in the innovation of the jth variable in period t(ujt), the value of the ith 
variable (FDIi), changes by cij,1 in the following period and by cij,2, cij,3 and so on in 
successive future periods. The VAR model also makes it possible to analyze the 
decomposition of forecast error variance thereby providing a measure of the overall 
relative importance of an individual variable in generating variations in its own and on 
other variables. That is, the effect that each variable in the system has on itself and on 
each other variables over different time horizons can be measured by decomposing this 
forecast variance error.  
In summary, the VAR analysis provides information on two important aspects of 
the structure of interactions among the FD flows and the three kinds of risks that affected 
FDI: (1) if innovations in a particular risk explain a substantial amount of variations in 
other variables and cannot be accounted for by innovations in other risks, then the risk is 
relatively influential to other risks and FDI, and (2) if the impulse response of FDI to a 
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shock in another risks tapers off quickly, then FDI response effectively and quickly to 
these risks. 
The VAR requires the determination of the appropriate lag structure in the system. I 
chose the lag structure using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) in conjunction with 
analyzing the estimated model’s residuals, so they do not exhibit any significant 
autocorrelation.  
 
3.1. Data Sources 
The “raw” data set for this study includes the whole population of Middle East 
and North Africa Countries; which accounts for 19 countries. However, the actual 
estimation of the model has removed two countries of Iraq and Palestine, since the war on 
the first one and the occupation on the second one cause unavailability of data. With this 
restriction and missing country observations, the sample abates to 17 countries for the 
period 1980-2003. 
Data sources are obtained from two sources: The main part is from the World 
Development Indicators published by the World Bank and the second source is from the 
International Country Risk Guide / ICRG. Unfortunately, the time series of FDI inflows 
as a percentage of GDP for 6 countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, UAE, and 
Yemen) are short, and therefore we could not run the VAR on them, that reduce my 
sample to 11 countries only. 
 
3.2. Description of the Variables 
Net FDI Inflows as Percentage of GDP (FDI/GDP) 
Net FDI inflows (FDI/GDP), is the sum of (net) equity of capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short term-capital as shown in the balance of 
payment. The net FDI inflows is used rather than FDI stock, because data on capital stock 
are not comprehensive, and are expressed in book values without any adjustment for 
inflation and exchange rate variations. Beside that the use of net FDI inflows as 
percentage of GDP is to avoid the possibility of having a nonstationary endogenous 
variable in the regression, and to control for the size of the country which naturally 
affects the level FDI observed by each country - it quite misleading to compare countries 
in term of FDI flows without referring to their respective economic size -. The World 
Development Indicators are the sources of this variable. 
Inflation Rate  
Inflation rate is a key indicator of fiscal and monetary policies of a country; the 
stability of the price level is particularly important for the process of economic decision 
taking, which requires that prices perform their usual information function and that their 
changes remain predictable (Kamar and Bakarzhieve, 2002). If we take the MENA 
economies as an example, most of them experienced a general deceleration in inflation as 
a result of prudent monetary and fiscal policies. Generally, tightened demand 
management policies and in some countries exchange rate corrections, helped to reduce 
external current account deficits. But despite this deceleration in inflation, it seems that 
the group of MENA countries adopting floating exchange rates registered higher inflation 
rates than the pegged group (like Jordan and other Gulf Cooperation Countries). As in 
year 2000, Sudan and Yemen (adopting a floating exchange rate regime) registered the 
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highest inflation rats in the region (10% and 9%, respectively) compared to an average of 
0.4% inflation rate in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (Karam, 2001).  
This explains one of the reasons why FDI inflow –for example- in the Gulf Cooperation 
Countries is higher than in Yemen. According to Froot and Stei (1991) and Makki and 
Somwatu (2004), a lower inflation rate should mean a better climate for investment, trade 
and therefore, economic growth, which has been supported by Apergis and Katrakilidis, 
(1998) when they argue that inflation and inflation uncertainty are found to affect FDI 
negatively. These facts could explain the use of inflation rate as a suitable proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. Also the World Development Indicators are the sources of this 
variable. 
Corruption Index (green instead of this, if yes delete their references) 
Cultural differences are reflected in the formal governance structures, laws, and 
practices, as well as in the more informal, undocumented contracting practices of the 
market, all of which impact firm transactions (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). The foreign 
firm must not only obtain a thorough understanding of the formal government structures 
that dictate the firm’s external market relationships, the firm must also understand the 
informal practices that facilitate, impede, or correspond with the formal processes. One 
significant example of informal practices involves the level of corruption in the external 
environment; as a part from raising the cost of doing business, corruption slows down the 
process of obtaining the business permits necessary for operating in the host country 
(Onyeiwu, 2000). Beside that, when a country has a higher level of corruption (which is 
the case in most of the DCs as well as in the MENA countries) there are more covert 
practices about which the foreign firm is not likely to be fully knowledgeable than for a 
foreign firm in another country with a low level of corruption.  
Erlich and Lui (1999) argue that corruption appears to be higher in poorer countries than 
in countries with stronger economies, but occurs in virtually all economies. The DCs is a 
good example here; although the overall investment climate in the DCs have changed for 
better, but still corruption, bureaucratic red tape and duplication, exist and manage 
successfully to deter country. Indeed, an understanding of how FDI and uncertainty relate 
to corruption can aid policy developers in both governmental and private enterprise 
settings. For example, if a manger at a multinational firm that is considering a potential 
market is aware that market has pattern of high corruption followed by massive influx of 
FDI, certain procedures and protocols for dealing with local contacts may need to be 
adjusted depending on current economic situation (Robertson and Watson, 2004).  
 
This is an assessment of corruption within the cultural system. Such corruption is 
a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the both the cultural as well 
as the economic environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by 
enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability; and 
introduces an inherent instability into the economical process. Beside that, when a 
country has a higher level of corruption (which is the case in most of the DCs as well as 
in the MENA countries) there are more covert practices about which the foreign firm is 
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not likely to be fully knowledgeable than for a foreign firm in another country with a low 
level of corruption.  The sign of this index in this study is expected to be ambiguous, 
noting that the ICRG has scored this index as: of 6 points equates to very low corruption 
and a score of 0 points to very high corruption.  
 
Political risk index 
The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political 
stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis. This is done by 
assigning risk points to a pre-set group of factors, termed political risk components, such 
as government Stability, socioeconomic conditions, military in politics, law and order, 
etc. According to ICRG a political risk rating of 0.0% to 49.9% indicates a very high risk; 
50.0% to 59.9% high risk; 60.0% to 69.9% moderate risk; 70.0% to 79.9% low risk; and 
80.0% or more very low risk. The sign of this index is expected to be negative. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Variance Decomposition 
 
The variance decomposition analysis measures the percentage of forecast error of 
a variable that is explained by another variable. It indicates the relative impact that one 
variable has upon another variable within the VAR system. The variance decomposition 
enables us to assess the economic significance of these impacts as the percentage of the 
forecast error for a variable sum to one. The orthogonalization procedure of the VAR 
system decomposes the forecast error variance; the component that measures the fraction 
of fluctuations in variables of particular variable explained innovations in each of the four 
variables (FDI, and inflation, corruption, political risks).  
 
Table 3 provides the variance decomposition of the 2-, 4-, and 6- year ahead forecast 
errors of each variable, accounted by innovations in each four variables.  
The results indicate that all the risks are pretty exogenous –but not very strongly- 
in the sense that the percentage of innovations with respect to FDI does not exceed 84% - 
in the case of Oman- (noting that this result is supported by the previous finding; that a 
considerable interaction exists among the oil and non-oil countries). The percentage of 
risk explanatory power as indicated by the “all” column is very strong, reaching 99% at 
times.  
Though the degree of influenced differs across countries, Table 3 shows that (for 
example) FDI in Algeria influences all the three risks and accounts for between 0.32% 
and 13.62% of the forecast error variance of these risks. Whereas, FDI in Saudi Arabia 
influences all risks and accounts for between 4.04% and 44.66% of the forecast error 
variance of these risks. But since the main aim here is measuring the percentage of 
forecast error of FDI that is explained by risks, the concentration will be on the first three 
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rows. At the end of year four, all the risks collectively explain only 3.21% of the 
fluctuations in FDI flows in Morocco, whereas, these risks explain 42.96% of the 
fluctuations in FDI flows in Sudan. 
The results also indicate that there is a dominant risk that influences FDI flows in 
each country and links their interdependence. Political risk influences FDI flows in four 
out of eleven countries (Algeria, Iran, Jordan, and Tunisia). For Algeria; this risk 
performs 87% of all risks (15.43÷17.68) that causes fluctuation in FDI flows, and 
performs 72% of all the risks that cause fluctuation in FDI flows in both Jordan 
(20.69÷28.76) and Iran (7.3÷10.2). Five of the eleven countries (Bahrain, Oman 
Morocco, Sudan, and Syria) their FDI flows influenced by corruption risk; since it 
performs 95% and 85% of all the risks that cause fluctuation in FDI flows in Syria 
(17.33÷18.29) and Oman (71.6÷84.04) respectively. Finally, the inflation risk influences 
FDI flows in two out of the eleven countries (Egypt, and Saudi Arabia), where it 




2 96.46 1.30 0.00 2.24 3.54
4 89.43 2.22 0.02 8.32 10.57
6 82.32 2.21 0.03 15.43 17.68
2 0.32 98.54 0.32 0.82 1.46
Algeria 4 0.64 92.15 1.75 5.46 7.85
6 2.53 80.70 3.17 13.61 19.30
2 7.09 2.18 90.62 0.11 9.38
4 11.15 1.23 86.54 1.08 13.46
6 13.62 1.06 82.28 3.04 17.72
2 1.81 0.09 84.37 13.73 86.27
4 2.61 0.21 83.45 13.73 86.27
6 2.87 0.40 82.85 13.88 86.12
2 74.15 5.24 14.29 6.32 25.85
4 63.80 5.66 22.99 7.55 36.20
6 50.71 4.11 37.57 7.60 49.29
2 18.52 50.66 24.56 6.25 49.34
Bahrain 4 19.66 37.27 38.91 4.16 62.73
6 25.25 27.45 35.83 11.47 72.55
2 15.24 4.62 79.64 0.50 20.36
4 29.81 5.84 54.96 9.39 45.04
6 44.20 4.07 26.65 25.08 73.35
2 15.46 29.83 8.21 46.50 53.50
4 18.10 34.79 7.27 39.84 60.16
6 23.10 28.64 14.42 33.84 66.16
2 98.49 0.05 0.14 1.32 1.51
4 88.18 7.92 2.49 1.41 11.82
6 85.45 10.03 3.11 1.42 14.55
2 30.62 58.40 6.87 4.11 41.60
Egypt 4 22.74 63.80 6.25 7.21 36.20
6 21.29 57.53 15.41 5.77 42.47
2 0.38 0.77 98.15 0.70 1.85
4 15.32 4.80 76.43 3.45 23.57
6 12.95 10.85 64.03 12.17 35.97
2 2.29 8.39 40.38 48.94 51.06
4 2.45 8.93 41.34 47.28 52.72
6 3.26 8.61 42.50 45.64 54.36
Entries in each cell are the perecntage of forecast error variance of the variable in the first column explained by 
the variable in the first row.
Entries in the "All" column denote the total percentage of forecast error variance of the variable in the first 






















Variance Decomposition of forecast error of FDI flows for each country
By Innovation in
Country Horizon (years)











2 93.19 0.13 1.14 5.55 6.81
4 92.47 1.05 1.34 5.14 7.53
6 89.80 1.52 1.38 7.30 10.20
2 17.97 73.91 2.26 5.86 26.09
Iran 4 11.77 32.25 6.99 48.99 67.75
6 6.18 25.74 12.15 55.93 74.26
2 3.55 3.89 91.74 0.82 8.26
4 28.92 4.28 64.51 2.28 35.49
6 43.11 3.33 44.10 9.46 55.90
2 3.17 2.70 67.28 26.85 73.15
4 33.13 2.02 46.47 18.38 81.62
6 52.12 2.01 33.07 12.80 87.20
2 90.81 3.18 3.19 2.81 9.19
4 81.04 1.85 2.99 14.11 18.96
6 71.24 2.20 5.87 20.69 28.76
2 1.37 88.65 8.12 1.86 11.35
Jordan 4 7.41 66.41 22.97 3.21 33.59
6 7.09 64.92 22.01 5.99 35.08
2 7.13 5.89 86.98 0.00 13.02
4 8.21 8.37 83.37 0.04 16.63
6 9.15 7.54 83.23 0.08 16.77
2 6.61 5.47 86.22 1.69 98.31
4 5.49 8.40 85.09 1.02 98.98
6 5.13 8.13 85.72 1.02 98.98
2 99.15 0.71 0.12 0.02 0.85
4 96.79 0.76 2.42 0.03 3.21
6 97.51 0.98 1.49 0.01 2.49
2 19.83 77.16 3.01 0.00 22.84
Morocco 4 21.30 48.72 29.76 0.22 51.28
6 23.56 33.77 42.51 0.16 66.23
2 0.98 3.51 95.44 0.07 4.56
4 1.17 5.64 93.12 0.07 6.88
6 1.83 5.12 92.92 0.12 7.08
2 0.62 2.31 96.87 0.20 99.80
4 1.19 5.04 93.61 0.15 99.85
6 5.02 5.29 89.55 0.14 99.86
Entries in each cell are the perecntage of forecast error variance of the variable in the first column explained by 
the variable in the first row.
Entries in the "All" column denote the total percentage of forecast error variance of the variable in the first 




































2 94.94 4.92 0.01 0.13 5.06
4 53.22 6.48 31.43 8.88 46.78
6 15.96 6.28 71.65 6.11 84.04
2 6.12 75.51 0.04 18.33 24.49
Oman 4 7.27 60.83 13.12 18.78 39.17
6 3.71 25.00 63.04 8.24 75.00
2 0.30 0.72 98.95 0.04 1.05
4 2.57 0.57 96.75 0.11 3.25
6 0.23 1.41 98.14 0.22 1.86
2 6.38 49.23 3.58 40.81 59.19
4 6.65 50.30 2.81 40.24 59.76
6 6.14 49.94 4.89 39.03 60.97
2 67.60 28.08 4.11 0.21 32.40
4 64.86 28.27 6.37 0.50 35.14
6 49.87 45.04 4.71 0.37 50.13
2 35.43 63.28 1.24 0.05 36.72
Saudi Arabia 4 44.66 52.21 3.05 0.08 47.79
6 44.63 51.92 3.35 0.10 48.08
2 4.09 20.23 75.35 0.33 24.65
4 20.44 17.65 61.58 0.33 38.42
6 27.38 31.15 41.13 0.34 58.87
2 4.27 21.42 73.09 1.22 98.78
4 21.19 19.08 58.68 1.05 98.95
6 31.77 27.48 39.98 0.77 99.23
2 71.43 0.86 27.66 0.05 28.57
4 57.04 6.27 35.99 0.70 42.96
6 50.79 11.10 37.54 0.58 49.21
2 0.56 87.07 5.96 6.41 12.93
Sudan 4 8.62 61.18 14.86 15.33 38.82
6 15.38 51.94 21.10 11.58 48.06
2 21.26 6.72 69.96 2.06 30.04
4 26.69 15.22 56.40 1.69 43.60
6 27.73 18.47 52.39 1.41 47.61
2 6.12 8.18 3.14 82.56 17.44
4 15.92 21.40 12.63 50.05 49.95
6 19.21 24.35 17.92 38.53 61.47
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Entries in each cell are the perecntage of forecast error variance of the variable in the first column explained by the 
variable in the first row.
Entries in the "All" column denote the total percentage of forecast error variance of the variable in the first column 













2 89.91 0.92 9.16 0.00 10.09
4 83.22 0.85 15.91 0.02 16.78
6 81.71 0.92 17.33 0.04 18.29
2 7.61 91.81 0.34 0.25 8.19
Syria 4 7.17 89.09 2.95 0.79 10.91
6 6.55 87.13 5.27 1.04 12.87
2 20.64 1.59 77.77 0.01 22.23
4 25.42 3.22 71.33 0.02 28.67
6 25.71 4.19 70.09 0.02 29.91
2 0.72 47.81 26.82 24.66 75.34
4 1.43 60.87 21.77 15.94 84.06
6 1.24 63.48 22.05 13.22 86.78
2 94.25 2.84 2.20 0.71 5.75
4 84.78 2.64 6.68 5.89 15.22
6 78.60 2.74 9.26 9.40 21.40
2 30.61 61.96 0.04 7.39 38.04
Tunisia 4 30.72 46.90 0.37 22.01 53.10
6 28.47 40.67 0.37 30.49 59.33
2 5.30 7.99 85.99 0.71 14.01
4 9.04 14.57 75.82 0.57 24.18
6 12.57 17.66 69.12 0.65 30.88
2 9.44 0.96 1.23 88.37 11.63
4 9.55 1.52 0.98 87.95 12.05
6 10.31 2.40 1.81 85.47 14.53
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4.2. Impulse responses of FDI to chocks in risks 
 
The estimated impulse responses of the VAR system offer an additional way of 
examining how FDI inflows respond to innovations from risks. Tables 4 and Figure 2 
summarize the impulse responses of FDI to Cholesky one standard deviation unit shock 
in inflation, corruption, and political risks for each country. 
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Table 4
 Period INF COR POL INF COR POL INF COR POL INF COR POL
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 -0.102 -0.004 0.133 2.133 3.522 -2.342 0.030 -0.053 0.162 -0.011 -0.032 0.070
3 -0.179 -0.013 0.290 2.935 -0.532 -1.487 0.369 -0.055 0.246 -0.034 -0.046 0.085
4 -0.233 -0.023 0.462 4.335 -0.089 0.333 0.637 -0.292 0.236 -0.055 -0.060 0.099
5 -0.270 -0.032 0.649 3.959 4.362 0.594 0.827 -0.345 0.258 -0.073 -0.073 0.154
6 -0.294 -0.038 0.850 3.885 8.586 -1.381 0.981 -0.467 0.226 -0.091 -0.072 0.160
7 -0.308 -0.041 1.065 4.076 6.949 -3.203 1.054 -0.629 0.137 -0.098 -0.052 0.122
8 -0.314 -0.041 1.292 4.463 5.151 -5.104 1.090 -0.795 0.041 -0.087 -0.027 0.105
9 -0.316 -0.035 1.532 3.288 6.116 -7.676 1.113 -0.986 -0.085 -0.071 -0.012 0.095
10 -0.313 -0.025 1.785 0.877 9.751 -11.169 1.119 -1.195 -0.224 -0.062 -0.007 0.083
Jordan
 Period INF COR POL INF COR POL INF COR POL INF COR POL
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.169 -0.425 0.883 -0.105 -0.043 -0.019 0.074 -0.003 0.012 -0.310 -0.168 0.005
3 0.032 -0.501 0.356 -0.070 -0.237 -0.031 0.067 -0.154 -0.129 -0.478 -0.319 0.010
4 -0.132 -0.487 0.249 -0.107 -0.175 -0.030 -0.029 -0.374 -0.133 -0.446 -0.384 0.020
5 -0.197 -0.459 0.103 -0.017 -0.188 -0.030 -0.225 -0.447 -0.314 -0.336 -0.414 0.028
6 -0.273 -0.300 -0.264 -0.182 -0.012 -0.040 -0.293 0.318 -0.375 -0.244 -0.442 0.030
7 -0.302 -0.153 -0.387 -0.085 -0.095 -0.049 -0.213 2.308 -0.411 -0.203 -0.472 0.024
8 -0.318 0.000 -0.531 -0.138 0.198 -0.042 0.052 4.071 -0.323 -0.204 -0.499 0.014
9 -0.339 0.155 -0.619 0.107 0.292 -0.030 0.065 0.337 -0.288 -0.224 -0.520 0.002
10 -0.346 0.273 -0.604 -0.131 0.737 -0.036 -1.168 -15.830 -0.693 -0.244 -0.534 -0.010
 Period INF COR POL INF COR POL INF COR POL
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 -0.119 -0.675 -0.029 0.054 0.171 0.003 -0.191 0.168 0.095
3 0.097 -1.175 0.079 0.067 0.314 -0.001 -0.237 0.356 0.283
4 0.418 -1.658 0.154 0.058 0.414 -0.008 -0.225 0.541 0.488
5 0.763 -2.100 0.170 0.043 0.486 -0.014 -0.183 0.708 0.678
6 1.077 -2.494 0.133 0.030 0.538 -0.019 -0.130 0.852 0.840
7 1.338 -2.829 0.061 0.019 0.576 -0.023 -0.074 0.973 0.969
8 1.541 -3.103 -0.026 0.011 0.605 -0.025 -0.021 1.073 1.068
9 1.692 -3.321 -0.115 0.004 0.626 -0.027 0.027 1.155 1.140
10 1.799 -3.488 -0.196 -0.002 0.643 -0.028 0.070 1.224 1.190
 Cholesky Ordering: FDI Inflows, Inflation, Corruption, Poiltical Risk
 Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)
Morocco Oman Saudi Arabia
Sudan Syria Tunisia
Accumulated Response of FDI to One S.D Innovations in Inflation, Corruption, and Political Risks for each country
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Starting with Algeria, its FDI inflows react positively to a chock originated in 
political risk, and this reaction is increasing with time (1.785 for period 10 years). 
However, FDI react negatively to a chock generated in inflation, and this reaction taper 
off very slowly with time horizon. As for Bahrain, there is unclearness about the 
dominant risk that affects FDI inflows, but it seems that corruption risk can be 
characterized to be a dominant risk; knowing that FDI reacts positively to a chock in 
corruption and inflation but it reacts negatively to a chock in political risk. While it is 
obvious for Egypt that economical risk plays a dominant role; since inflation has the most 
effect on FDI, whereas, FDI reacts negatively to a chock in corruption. 
For Iran, it is not clear which is the dominant risk, however there are some 
indicators that political risk relatively plays significant role in affecting FDI. The same 
results can be implemented for Jordan; that FDI has persistent reaction to chocks 
generated from political risk. In addition, FDI in Jordan reacts effectively to chocks from 
corruption. While in Morocco, cultural risk finds to play a dominant role in affecting 
FDI; since corruption (the proxy for cultural risk) has the major influence in affecting 
FDI.  
Oman shows different picture in the duration how FDI reacts to chocks in 
different kinds of risks. FDI starts reacting to chocks generated in inflation from the fifth 
year, while it takes FDI three years to start reacting to chocks originated in both 
corruption and political risks. Given that the chock in the corruption has the most effect 
on FDI is an indication that in of Oman, cultural risk can be considered the dominant risk 
that affects FDI flows. This is not the case for Saudi Arabia; results in Table 4 show that 
the most react of FDI goes towards chocks originated in both inflation and corruption. 
While the way of FDI reaction to corruption risk increasing with time horizons, whilst for 
inflation, it seems that this reaction taper off slowly with time horizon. Concerning 
political risk, it is obvious that it plays a marginal role in affecting FDI there.  
In the case of Sudan, corruption risk stands the first among other risks that affect 
FDI flows, one can find that the impulse responses remaining as high as -3.488 followed 
by inflation 1.799 at the end of tenth year. The impulse responses of FDI in Syria indicate 
that the chocks of corruption risk has the most effect on FDI among other risks; since FDI 
in general shows a slow and persistence process in responding to corruption’s chocks, 
indicating that cultural risk is the dominant risk in Syria.  
Finally, the impulse responses to FDI in Tunisia indicate that corruption and political 
risks affecting FDI in general more than inflation; since the reaction of FDI in this 
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country to chocks in corruption and political characterized to be persistence, and remain 
as high as 1.224 and 1.19 respectively at the end of tenth year. 
 
In sum, despite the different magnitude of the variance decomposition and the impulse 
responses values of FDI inflows in the MENA countries, some observations can be made 
from Tables 3 and 4: 
1- Cultural risk plays a dominant role among the other risks that affect FDI in the 
MENA countries on the country level. According to the impulse responses, 6 out of 
11 countries (Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Sudan, and Syria) cultural risk 
found to be dominant risk. Where this result has been supported by the variance 
decomposition, except that cultural risk influences FDI fluctuations in 5 out from 11 
countries (Bahrain, Oman, Morocco, Sudan, and Syria).   
2- Subsidizing the countries into two regions (oil and non-oil countries), the variance 
decomposition indicates that for the oil countries both political and corruption risks 
manage to be at the same level as dominant risks affecting FDI. Political affects FDI 
inflows in 2 out from 5 oil-countries (Algeria and Iran), and corruption affects FDI 
inflows also in 2 out from 5 oil countries (Bahrain and Oman), whereas, corruption 
risk is a dominant risk that affects FDI flows in 3 out from 6 non-oil countries 
(Morocco, Sudan, and Syria). The impulse responses analysis manage to give a 
clearer picture; where cultural risk appears to be the dominant risk that causes 
fluctuations in FDI inflows in the two regions. 3 out of 5 oil countries (Bahrain, 
Oman, and Saudi Arabia) and also in 3 out of 6 non-oil countries (Morocco, Sudan, 
and Syria), so it can be said that cultural risk is the dominant risk for oil and non-oil 
countries. 
3- In general, FDI inflows show a slow and persistence process in reacting to the chocks 
originated from different risk, especially for political risk. Since both of the impulse 
responses and variance decomposition agreed that political risk is the second 
dominant risk that affects 4 out from 11 countries (Algeria, Iran, Jordan, and Tunisia). 
4- Economical risk found to be the least risk that affects FDI on the country base. One 
out from eleven countries (Egypt) the economical risk (proxied by inflation risk) has 
a dominant effect on FDI according to impulse responses, whereas, it has that kind of 
effect on FDI flows on only two countries (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) according to the 
variance decomposition analysis. 
  
5. DISCUSION AND RESULTS  
In this paper I tried to explore the most dominant risk that affects FDI inflows, 
and therefore discourage foreign investors from investing in the MENA countries. 
Having taking the country characteristics into account, the chosen risks have been 
analyzed on FDI inflows for each country individually through using the vector 
autoregressive technique. Results from both the variance decomposition and impulse 
responses analysis indicate that the cultural risk was the dominant risk that affects FDI 
inflows in the case of each country individually, and then it is followed immediately with 
the political risk as the second dominant risk. 
The economical risk has proved to take the last and the miner role in affecting 
FDI in the MENA countries individually. Despite the existence of such risks, foreign 
investors may not give them a great deal of interest. It seems that the availability of 
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natural resources generally in the Middle East countries, the reasonability of human costs, 
the importance of their geographic and strategic location , and the international political 
and economical agreements, have managed to eliminate the power of economical 
problems in the calculations of foreign investors. This could be seen from the kinds of 
FDI exists in the MENA countries and from their privileges; nearly all the foreign direct 
investments in the MENA countries are exports oriented not a market oriented or an 
efficiency one, and in some cases this investment could be inefficient or welfare-reducing 
or even cause environment pollution. This means that profits through exporting may be 
the main and only aim of the foreign investor not the benefits of the host country’s 
market. For achieving this goal, foreign investors follow their way in dealing with the 
Arabic economical problems, for example they rely more on their home country in 
financing their investments, as a way to avoid bureaucratic administrative procedures, 
exchange rates, and inflation rates that are widely exist in the MENA economics (Sadik 
and Bolbol, 2001).  
Hence it seems that there is a hidden risk behind the weakness flow of market and 
efficient seeking FDI in the region. My statistical results may shed the light on this 
hidden risk; which is not the famous risk that usually pointed to and called “political 
risk”, it is the cultural risk that approves to be the hidden and dominant risk in affecting 
FDI decision in all the MENA countries in general. The following facts may give some 
explanations for this phenomenon: 
1. The disappointing feelings of the Arab civilians toward their governments. Despite 
being in possession of massive oil and mineral wealth, the region has seen its average 
standard of living decline in relation to the rest of the world. The per capita income in 
the Arabic countries has only grown at an annual rate of 0.5% over the last 25 years, 
by contrast Eastern Asian economies, despite some political instability, economic 
cycles and financial crisis, managed a growth rate of 4.1%. Today, the combined 
GDP in all Arabic countries is less than half of Spain. 
2.  The high level of corruption on both the governmental and the legislation institutions 
have deeply hurt the economical structure; that many of the reforms were poorly 
thought through or fell victim to the an inefficient administration and corruption. This 
has pushed the civilians to look for alternatives to their governments. 
3. The intensive efforts of the Western countries presented by United States in imposing 
the democratic process in the Middle East countries (the New Middle East Model), 
though stimulating their kind of democracy (like elections, human rights, and woman 
rights), and force it on the Middle East countries without considering and caring of 
the Middle East’s cultural characteristics and religion standings, the failure of the 
American democratic experiment in Iraq can be a good example for that.  
4. The cultural differences between Western and Eastern countries, especially the 
Western misunderstanding to Islamic religion basics have unfortunately played a 
great part in increasing the cap between the two civilizations. For example, what is 
called in the Western countries “freedom of speech and press” is crossing the red 
lines and steeping on the “religion fundamentals” according to the Eastern definition. 
For example the Denmark press freedom on 2005-2006 caused great humiliation to 
the Islamic religion, which raised the political tension between Arabic countries and 
Europe and pushed the former to economically break the Denmark products. 
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5. The wide existence of sectarianism movements in the Middle East countries (such as 
Shiite, Kurdish, and Sonah), that predominant on the national identity, as in the case 
of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon have also pushed the civilians to 
search for alternative to solve this problem. 
6. The high level of masculine in the Middle East countries. It is known that the 
masculine values assertiveness, aggressiveness, and materialism tend to associate 
with higher degree of corruption than do the feminine values; which tend to be social 
(Hofstede, 1997). For example, in Saudi Arabia (the most Middle East country that 
attracts FDI) women do not have any political rights and are excluded from any 
decision making in any aspect in the country. 
7. The above facts have managed to raise the Islamic movements as a way of expressing 
the inside anger. The present and the future indications are toward the increase of the 
Islamic movements and raise their role in the Arabic parliaments as in Egypt, and 
even reaching the government chare as in Iran and Palestine  
8. As soon as the Western countries have manage to spread their kind of democracy on 
the Middle East through elections, the Arabs have immediately responded and took 
advantage of the first democratic opportunity and went to what is called “punishment 
elections” by electing the Islamic groups. This may be not because civilians believe 
their ideologies but because such groups were the only parts who are wearing the 
costume of change. In other words the Arabs have used the democratic elections as a 
punishment tool for their governments, sectarianism movements, and the West 
regime.    
 
It can be concluded that the above aspects among others have expanded the grey area 
between the cultural and the political risks in the Middle East countries, and it seems that 
cultural risk leads to political risk especially that in some cases both of the risks are 
taking the same level in affecting FDI decision (as approved by the variance 
decomposition result). Cultural risk in the past was not playing a major role in the foreign 
investor’s calculations, but the present and future indications are suggesting the 
predominance of cultural risk on other kind of risks. According to the UNDP (2002) 
cultural risks seems to be the reason for the fact that MENA countries attracted less than 
1% of global FDI and only 4% of FDI directed to the DCs.  
Practical experiences approved the ability of foreign investors to deal with political and 
economical risks as long as their risk-adjustment rate of return is high as in the case of 
Ghana. But when it comes to the cultural threats that are expanding, foreign investors 
need to reconsider well his motives in investment strategies in the Middle East before 
starting with the practical movements - regardless the country his is targeting- (Mmieh 
and Frimpong, 2004). 
The future signs also hint that cultural risk is a contagion “disease” that could be 
extremely spread in all the MENA countries, this may remove the shadow from the 
mysterious phenomenon exists in some of the MENA countries that despite they are 
characterized with political stability (like Oman, Qatar, Morocco, and Yemen) or with 
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